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The Partition of Ireland: Anglo-Irish Relations as Reflected in a Political Idea 
In June of 2016, a British referendum decided that Britain would leave the European 
Union, and with it would go the six counties of Northern Ireland. After years of postponement, 
and at the time of writing, Britain is set to leave the European Union on December 31, 2020, 
after complications mainly due to the new-age “Irish Question:'' how to handle the border 
between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland in the south? The reemergence of a hard 
political border seems to be a likely possibility for Ireland, which would be devastating to both 
Irish and British societies and economies with increased political violence, and the imposition of 
new trade customs in the North.  
This “Irish Backstop” as Brexit politicians have coined it, continues to plague the Brexit 
process, and its effects can be seen across all of Ireland with a sharp increase in political support 
for the historic nationalistic Sinn Féin party, both North and South. Following the uncertainty of 
what Brexit has in store for the North, particularly regarding the border, a resurgence of partisan 
violence is occuring in the North, something which the Irish are all too familiar with by this 
point. Brexit is the latest thorn in the side of Anglo-Irish relations, and not since the Troubles of 
the late twentieth century has Ireland stood to be so divided. Britain leaving the EU puts the 
sovereignty of Northern Ireland in question, as the 2016 referendum stands to invalidate crucial 
elements of the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, which ended the Troubles. Anglo-Irish 
relations are again deteriorating, and to understand current Anglo-Irish relations related to the 
border issue between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, in the context of Brexit, it is 
first necessary to gain a better understanding of the origins of that border. 
Many Irish are governed by the old adage ‘whatever you say, say nothing,’ born from a 
long history of oppression and abuse. In other words, topics that make one uncomfortable need 
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not be talked about. For this reason, partition as a topic sits on the periphery of modern Irish 
popular discourse, though it singularly defines Irish experiences throughout the twentieth 
century. The border in the North is not yet 100 years old, but has affected tremendously modern 
Irish history, and facilitates the deterioration of Anglo-Irish relations. Implemented officially in 
1925, the Irish partition separates the six Northern counties of Antrim, Armagh, Derry, Down, 
Fermanagh, and Tyrone from the remaining 26 counties of the Republic of Ireland. The 
seemingly arbitrary demarcation follows no geographic landmarks, bisects roughly 270 public 
roads, and in some areas divided homes along the border, which led to some interesting and 
unfortunate run-ins with authorities on both sides of the border.  
 These counties were left out of the legislation which established the Irish Free State due 
to a complex minority issue: Protestants centered in the North perceived to be under attack by the 
Catholic masses attempting to form a government outside of the United Kingdom. This led to 
bitter contestation of the border between those who wished to dismantle it, and those who sought 
to defend it, with partisan violence plaguing Catholic and Protestant communities surrounding 
and within the border. This thesis brings partition to the front of an increasingly dynamic modern 
Irish history by tracing the idea of partition as a viable solution to the ever-changing “Irish 
Question” from its inception to its implementation. I will explore the complexity of the minority 
issues within Ireland, as well as explaining how Anglo-Irish relations deteriorated from the Act 
of Union of 1800, to the official partitioning of Ireland in 1925. 
An analysis of legislation and newspaper articles about the Home Rule Movement during 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries shows the evolution of partitioning Ireland moving from 
an idea to a reality. British parliamentary debates show the development of the several 
Government of Ireland (Home Rule) Bills, which later established the partition of Ireland as it 
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stands today. Finally, both British parliamentary and Dáil Éireann debates over the Anglo-Irish 
Treaty (1921), which ended the Irish War for Independence and reaffirmed a partitioned Ireland, 
demonstrated the real points of contention among all political sects involved. All of this helps 
show how partitioning Ireland came to fruition as a British decision accepted by the Irish, in 
hopes of someday unifying their island. Tuning in to the historiography of the partition of Ireland 
generated a strong foundation upon which I launched my research. The long discussion of the 
Irish partition ranges from the nationalistic fervor of outright blaming Britain for 
“dismembering”1 Ireland, to a more objective approach to how the inevitability of partition could 
not be avoided. Though as the publishing dates of the literature increases, so too does the 
objectivity of the discussion.  
Published in the midst of the Irish Repeblican Army (IRA) Border Campaign in 1957, 
Frank Gallagher’s The Indivisible Island ironically starts by explaining how the Irish have 
seldom been a united people, and that England has had a large role in this. Gallagher, a former 
IRA volunteer, explains that British Conservatives used the idea of partition as a political play-
thing to hinder Liberal efforts to grant Ireland Home Rule. Conservatives, such as the British 
Tory and Unionist parties, made the demand of a partitioned Ireland knowing that Nationalists 
and Liberals would never concede to such an idea. But to Gallagher, even entertaining the idea 
that partition was necessary or inevitable, as some historians continue to do, is “unjust” and 
“absurd.”2 Gallagher claims that a national Irish (Catholic) government could protect and cherish 
Protestant interests. However, one can speculate just how protected these interests would be in a 
new nation where the Catholic clergy heavily influenced the state legislature for the decades 
presiding over Partition. For a man who spent many long stints behind bars for IRA activity, he 
 
1 Frank Gallagher, The Indivisible Island (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1957), 300. 
2 Gallagher, The Indivisible Island, 306. 
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must not have noticed how quickly Home Rule became ‘Rome’ Rule in the years following 
Partition. Nonetheless, Gallagher’s work influenced many Irish historians, politicians, and social 
activists of the twentieth century. 
 By the 1980s, historians had dug deeper into the divide as social tensions in Ireland, 
particularly in the province of Ulster, continued to flare between the Irish and British during the 
three decades known as the Troubles, 1969-1998. Published during the Troubles in 1983, Irish 
historian Michael Laffan’s The Partition of Ireland analyzes the social differences between the 
province of Ulster and the rest of Ireland. A more even-handed approach to a very sensitive topic 
at the time, Laffan explains that partition was a solution, one of many, to a centuries-old conflict 
between two separate ‘nations’ in Ireland.3 Ulster has always been different from the rest of 
Ireland, most notably in the post-colonial English rule where it colloquially became known as a 
British, Protestant stronghold. Ulster maintained its connection to Britain via plantation efforts 
and Protestant Scottish lowland migrations, which helped to further distinguish itself from the 
rest of Ireland as predominantly British (Protestant).  
 Published in the wake of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, English historian Thomas 
Hennessey’s Dividing Ireland maintains the two-nationalities theory, claiming partition was 
inevitable as there were two distinct Irish nationalities in Ireland. This seems to be widely 
accepted as the end result for partition debates, as academics in recent years have turned to face 
the economic and social repercussions of a divided Ireland. Ultimately, partition boiled down to 
political decisions made by both British and Irish politicians during the tumultuous years that 
encompassed World War One. Hennessey undoubtedly proved the transformative powers of 
World War One on Irish nationalism, which encompassed the Dublin Easter Rising of 1916. He 
 
3 Michael Laffan, The Partition of Ireland, 1911-25 (Dublin, Ireland: Dundalgan Press, 1983), 1. 
6 
explains how Irish Nationalists moved from seeking a devolved form of government within the 
United Kingdom in 1914 to determinedly pursuing a free Irish Republic outside of the British 
Empire by 1918. 
There is one indisputable factor that is thematic throughout the discussion of Anglo-Irish 
relations in regard to partition: by the twentieth century, Ulster was profoundly different from the 
rest of Ireland, and social, sectarian, and political divides between Ulster and the rest of Ireland 
persist into the present. The existence of this divide is centuries old and stems from the Norman 
invasions of the 1100s, but more prominently the Cromwellian conquest of Ireland in the mid 
1600s, in which Oliver Cromwell hacked his way across Ireland mythically coining the slogan, 
‘to Hell or to Connacht’ as he drove Irish Catholics in Ulster to the barren and boggy hinterlands. 
In Cromwell’s wake, a flood of lowland Protestant Scots entered Ulster with the support of the 
Elizabethan plantation schemes, ensuring Protestants owned the most valuable land in Ireland. 
This cemented the divide that would come in later years to be the backbone of Irish Nationalist 
opposition, and ultimately led to Ireland’s geopolitical sundering. 
There is a degree of truth to the statement that Ulsterites are cut from a different cloth 
than those in the rest of Ireland. Midway through the Troubles, historians began to take note, and 
become more critical of, the population differences between Ulster and Ireland as a whole. R. F. 
Foster begins his anthology of modern Irish history with the chapter titled “Varieties of 
Irishness,” where he describes what he believes are three early variations of Irishness: the Gaelic 
Irish, the native inhabitants of Ireland; the Old English, the descendants of the first Anglo-
Norman colonizers who became Gaelicized over time, termed “the English of Irish birth”; and 
the New English, the wealthier, Protestant landowners of various plantation schemes.4  
 
4 R. F. Foster, Modern Ireland 1600-1972 (London, UK: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1988), 12-3. 
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In 1998, both English and Irish historians became more critical of the nationalistic 
differences between the population in Ireland and Ulster in particular. In Dividing Ireland, 
Hennessy argues that ‘Britishness’ - what Unionists in Ulster referred to themselves as - was 
composed of multiple imagined communities, and involved building new national identities upon 
older ones.5 He considered the British national identity to be over-arching and elastic: it allows 
the development of new national identities under the umbrella of British identity, superimposed 
on existing cultural identities. So long as one pledged allegiance to the Crown - the head of the 
British nation - and put that allegiance above all else, you could form your own individual 
national identity within. Hennesssy states, “Britishness did not require the sacrifice of older 
national identities.”6 Thus, Ulster Protestants possessed a constantly fluctuating dual national 
identity of being Irish beneath their Britishness. 
This is what Irish historian David Fitzpatrick in The Two Irelands 1912-1939 claimed led 
to a “dual revolution” in Ireland during the Home Rule crisis of 1912-1920.7 Ireland’s desire for 
national self-governance caused Ulster Unionists to retaliate as they sought independence from a 
presumed Irish Home Rule, leaving each state after partition with a “dual political legacy.”8 Each 
political legacy contains a minority crisis that partition was meant to solve: in the North, the 
Catholic minority, wanting to be included in Irish independence, lost having been left out of 
Home Rule against their wishes, while in the South, the Protestant minority, wanting to remain 
within the Union, lost having been taken out of the Union against their wishes. Both Irish 
Nationalists and Ulster Unionists resisted British authority in their own way, simultaneously 
 
5 Thomas Hennessey, Dividing Ireland: World War One and Partition (London, UK: Routledge, 1998), xii. 
6 Hennessey, Dividing Ireland, xii. 
7 David Fitzpatrick, The Two Irelands 1912-1939 (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 1998), 2. 
8 Fitzpatrick, The Two Irelands, 205. 
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trying to subvert British rule in Ireland.9 Nationalists wanted Home Rule, with or without the six-
county (Ulster) exclusion, while Unionists would not stand for Home Rule, or at least anything 
less than the six-county exclusion in the end. 
The province of Ulster developed separately from the three other provinces of Ireland 
during the nineteenth century, mainly in that Ulster became heavily industrialized compared to 
the agricultural provinces of Leinster, Munster, and Connacht.10 Industrialization was considered 
a mark of civilization by the British, and a key concept in both British imperialism, and what 
helped Ulster Protestants identify as British. This led to a stark class division in Ulster, in which 
Unionists of all classes successfully banded together using Protestantism, and loyalty to the 
Crown, as a socioeconomic adhesive, viewing themselves as a Protestant minority under 
Catholic siege, reminiscent of the 1688 Siege of Derry.11 However, the demography somewhat 
defies this rhetoric, as the combination of imperialism and industrialization creates something 
that is at times difficult to understand. The last Irish census conducted within the British Empire 
helps to showcase the complexity of the minority issues Ireland faced during the Home Rule 
crisis of 1870-1920.  
The 1911 census of Ireland puts the total registered population in Ireland at 4,391,412 of 
whom 1,147,579 (26 percent) identified as Protestant, making them a sizable minority 
throughout the country. The ‘Protestant stronghold’ of Ulster, however, showed a different 
sectarian dichotomy with the total population of 1,581,969 of whom 890,880 (56 percent) 
identified as Protestant, making them the majority, albeit slim. In the remaining provinces of 
Munster, Leinster, and Connacht, only 256,699 of the total 2,809,443 (9.1 percent) of the 
 
9 Fitzpatrick, The Two Irelands, vii. 
10 Hennessey, Dividing Ireland, 4. 
11 Siege of Derry (1688-1689), when the Catholic forces of King James II were unable to retake the city from the 
Protestant defenders, an event which took on mythic status for Ulster Unionists, still celebrated annually.  
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population identified as Protestant.12 Protestants in Ulster did not constitute as large a majority as 
Catholics did elsewhere in Ireland; and while Protestants could rightfully claim to be a minority 
in Ireland, Catholics in Ulster could rightfully claim to be part of the minority as well. This is the 
origin of what led to six counties in Ulster remaining within the confines of the United Kingdom, 
while the rest of Ireland became a dominion of the British Empire until complete independence 
in 1949. Portions of Ulster were already separated - socially, nationalistically, and religiously - 
before the time of partition. 
The history of partition is rooted in the parliamentary quest to answer the “Irish 
Question” stemming from the Act of Union in 1800. The Act of Union came in response to the 
1798 United Irishmen Rebellion,13 and the larger British issue of pacifying the Celtic fringes of 
their Empire’s core. The Act of Union forcibly bound Ireland to the United Kingdom by turning 
Ireland into an overseas version of Scotland or Wales. But instead of becoming a full fledged 
member of the United Kingdom, Ireland became a lesser, incomplete member with minimal 
representation in Westminster. Viewed largely by Irish Catholics as incomplete, the Union 
repealed many of the Penal Laws that openly discriminated against Catholics. Catholics could 
now seek an education, build their churches with stone, and own a horse worth more than five 
pounds, but remained barred from holding any position of political power; those positions were 
reserved for the Protestant Ascendency. Along with remedying the complete mismanagement of 
Ireland by the British, Catholic parliamentary emancipation, by repealing the Act of Union 
became the rallying cry of Irish Nationalists for decades to come.   
 
12 National Archives of Ireland, Census of Ireland, 1911. 
13 1798 Rebellion, staged by the republican revolutionaries of The United Irishmen, supported by French forces, 
against British rule in Ireland. The Rebellion saw initial success, but was then swiftly suppressed resulting in 
thousands of revolutionary and civil deaths, as well as the Act of Union in 1800. 
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Led by Daniel O’Connell,14 the Repeal Movement ultimately sought to recognize the 
illegitimacy of the Union, and to find an alternative form of government in Ireland.15 O’Connell 
vehemently opposed violence, striving instead for passive resistance, and used popular politics as 
his weapon by invoking the notion of Repeal to rabble-rouse the Irish against the Union. He 
ultimately succeeded in this, earning Catholic participation in Westminster, but the vast majority 
of the Members of Parliament opposed Repeal viewing the shrinking of the Empire as 
preposterous. They brushed O’Connell and his Repeal Movement aside, but O’Connell 
continued to use Repeal as a way to push for some form of subordinate Irish parliament. While 
O’Connell tried for decades to win enough support for this, Anglo-Irish relations continued to 
deteriorate, largely due to Britain's dependency on Irish goods. 
Britain depended heavily on Irish agricultural and linen products both prior to, and briefly 
following the Union. With the ending of the Napoleonic Wars, European markets reopened and, 
with increased industrialization in Britain, came economic upheaval in Ireland. The prices of 
Ireland’s main exports plummeted as British demands for Irish goods waned. Britain 
subsequently underwent an industrial revolution during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
causing Irish industry in the north to all but disappear as cheap, machine-made products could be 
imported from Britain tariff-free as a member of the Union. Exacerbating the economic decline, 
Ireland’s population swelled, increasing from a mere half a million in 1745, to more than eight 
million in 1845.16 An enormous population, with few jobs available, caused unemployment to 
skyrocket, and those with jobs did not fare much better, as wages across Ireland plummeted, 
 
14 Daniel O’Connell, the firebrand political leader who mobilized the Catholic population of Ireland to repeal the 
Act of Union, to achieve Catholic parliamentary emancipation (achieved in 1829), and became the first Catholic 
elected in Westminster.  
15 Foster, Modern Ireland, 308-9. 
16 John Kelly, The Graves Are Walking (New York, NY: Picador, Henry Holt and Company, 2013), 8. 
11 
again thanks to British industrialization. With fewer jobs available, Irish peasants increasingly 
moved into the countryside for subsistence farming, mainly becoming tenants on larger, 
Protestant-owned plantations. 
Most Irish lands had been confiscated from Catholics during the Elizabethan plantation 
schemes, and distributed to Scottish and English colonists. The Penal Laws prior to the Union 
prevented Catholics from owning property, and while the Union overturned this to an extent, 
Irish peasants could not afford to buy or rent lands at reasonable prices. Their small plots of land 
only shrank when land was distributed equally among families through inheritance or dowries. 
This subdivision of lands contributed to the fact that by the 1840’s, nearly one million land 
holdings were smaller than ten acres.17 Making matters worse, Protestant landlords rarely 
reinvested their agricultural profits in their Irish endeavours. Instead, they chose to live 
extravagantly abroad, or invest in their more profitable endeavors in South Africa or South 
America, and seldom visited their estates in Ireland.  
By 1844, conditions in Ireland declined to such an extent that future British Prime 
Minister Benjamin Disraeli, during the onset of famine in Ireland, described the “Irish Question” 
as it came to be known for the remainder of the nineteenth century:  
A dense population, in extreme distress, inhabit an island where there is an 
Established Church, which is not their Church, and a territorial aristocracy, the 
richest of whom live in foreign capitals. Thus you have a starving population, an 
absentee aristocracy, and an alien Church; and in addition the weakest executive 
in the world. That is the Irish Question.18 
 
 
17 Tim Pat Coogan, The Famine Plot (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 21. 
18 The State of Ireland. Hansard, House of Commons Debates [Hansard] 16 February 1844, vol. 72, cc. 1016. 
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Disraeli, himself an older Tory, blamed a new type of  “Toryism” for antagonizing Irish 
Catholics by perpetuating a political system that promoted Protestantism and excluded Catholics 
from positions of power or status, as it had for two centuries. In his speech to the House of 
Commons, Disraeli perfectly describes the environment in which violent nationalism ferments. 
The Young Irelander Rebellion, staged just four years after Disraeli’s speech, only proved his 
point further. Ultimately, the Irish Question boiled down to how the British could handle and 
dissipate Irish nationalism, while maintaining social order in Ireland. By the time of Disraeli’s 
speech, Unionists in the North were already considering their own solutions to this dilemma.   
On 17 October, 1843, the first mention of partition as a solution to the increasingly 
complicated Irish Question appeared in an anonymous article published in the Northern Whig in 
Belfast. The author outlines notes of a possible petition to the Queen, which calls for the 
establishment of a kingdom in Northern Ireland should unrest in Ireland continue. This was in 
response to O’Connell’s call for repealing the Act of Union. It claimed the inhabitants of Ulster 
are of “a mixed race,” descending from, “Saxons, Danes, [and] Normans,” and are “far more 
intimately connected… with people of the neighboring shores in England and Scotland, than they 
are with the South and Southwest of Ireland.”19 The author argues that in the event of repealing 
the Act of Union, Ulster should be made into “a separate kingdom, having a separate 
legislature,” to in some way maintain its connection with England and Scotland.20  
Between 1845 and 1852, social tensions and nationalism continued to rise as Ireland 
suffered a catastrophic blight to the potato crop. With an increased amount of sustenance farming 
on nutrient deficient soil prior to the Famine, Irish paupers depended almost entirely on a diet of 
 
19 Anonymous, “Petition in Favor of the Union, or of ‘The Erection of the Kingdom of the North of Ireland.” 
Northern Whig, Belfast, Oct. 17, 1843. 
20 Anonymous, “Petition in Favor of the Union” Northern Whig, Belfast, Oct. 17, 1843. 
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cheap, easy-to-grow potatoes. The failure of a majority of potato crops for multiple years in the 
mid-1840s wreaked havoc on the poor, and swollen Irish population. Oddly, throughout the 
Famine years no shortage of food actually occurred in Ireland, only a shortage of affordable 
food.21 Food became unaffordable to the growing Irish pauper class as food prices and 
unemployment rose simultaneously, with those in work earning wages far smaller than those 
earned by their forebears. 
British policy on dealing with the Famine lay in the laissez faire economic teachings of 
Adam Smith. Thus, British legislators, such as Lords Charles Travelyan and John Russell, 
actively prohibited any form of government intervention in Irish markets, believing that markets 
would sort themselves out. Britain continued to export Irish agricultural goods unabated 
throughout the Famine, while the Irish starved, because Britain profited more from selling Irish 
food abroad rather than in Ireland. Many Irish historians, including journalist Tim Pat Coogan, 
equate the ineffectiveness of British policy on handling the Famine to state sanctioned genocide 
of the Irish.22 With more than a million deaths caused by starvation and fever, and another two 
million sent overseas via “Coffin Ship”23 transport, Gaelic culture all but disappeared, and the 
Irish population has yet to recover to this day. By the end of the Famine, one in three Irish had 
left Ireland by either a coffin, or aboard a coffin ship, and the Irish population continued to 
decline for the following decades.24  
 
21 Cecil Woodham-Smith, The Great Hunger: Ireland 1845-49, (London, UK: Harper & Row, 1992), 165. 
22 Coogan, The Famine Plot. 67. 
23 Coffin Ships were the cheapest mode of transportation Irish immigrants used as transport across the Atlantic to 
North America, the commissioners of which provided as little food, water, and living space as legally possible to the 
Irish immigrants. The overcrowded and disease-ridden ships resulted in thousands of deaths along their voyage, and 
a Typhus epidemic in Canada in 1847.  
24 Kelly, The Graves Are Walking. 2. 
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The Famine did succeed in cementing an Anglophobic outlook among the Irish, evident 
in the Fenian journalist John Mitchel’s apocalyptic rhetoric in remembering the Famine: “the 
Almighty, indeed, sent the potato blight, but England sent the famine.”25 This sort of resentment 
was already rooted deeply among Irish nationalist thinking by the time of the Famine, but 
Britain's genocidal policies during this period caused irreparable damage to Anglo-Irish 
relations, and formed a solid base for Irish resistance in the following decades. It took 150 years 
for British authorities to apologize for the atrocities during the Famine, when in 1997, in a step 
towards ameliorating Anglo-Irish relations at the tail end of the Troubles, British Prime Minister 
Tony Blair issued the first statement of apology for the Famine. 
The United Kingdom was the integral core of the British Empire, itself a sort of 
preeminent dominion that ruled over the other dominions within the Empire. Ireland’s position 
within the core of the British Empire became apparent during the Famine, as Britain steadily 
grew wealthier and more powerful, while Ireland descended into disorder and decay. During the 
Famine, former British PM Charles (Earl) Grey summarized Ireland's position within the United 
Kingdom in a speech made to the House of Lords:  
Ireland is the one weak place in the solid fabric of British power—Ireland is the 
one deep (I had almost said ineffaceable) blot upon the brightness of British 
honour. Ireland is our disgrace. It is the reproach, the standing disgrace, of this 
country, that Ireland remains in the condition she is. It is so regarded throughout 
the whole civilized world.26 
 
Grey explained that, even during the early onset of potato blight in Ireland, Britain's response to 
the Famine, “is of itself a complete and irrefutable proof of the misgovernment to which she 
 
25 John Mitchel, The Last Conquest of Ireland (Perhaps), ed. Patrick Maume (Dublin, Ireland: University College 
Dublin Press, 2005), 219. Originally published in 1861. 
26 State of Ireland. Hansard, House of Commons Debates [Hansard] 23 March 1846, vol. 84, cc. 1345.   
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[Ireland] has been subjected.”27 The Famine was the nadir of British mismanagement of Ireland, 
known as such among prominent political figures during the time. The Tory Party had split 
following the repeal of the Corn Laws during the onset of the Famine, Disraeli leading the more 
conservative branch, and the remainder merging with the Whigs later on to form the Liberal 
Party. Ireland, before and subsequently after the Act of Union, was continually mismanaged: by 
1876 the Irish population was in a steady decline, and its wealth so concentrated that fewer than 
800 landlords possessed half of the land in the country.28 
Irish nationalism struggled to shift towards parliamentary representation for Catholics in 
Westminster as violent nationalism rose in the wake of the Famine. The remnants of the 
nationalist movements who helped stage the Young Irelander Rebellion in 1848 reformed under 
the banner of the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB), then a secret society formed in 1858.29 
The same year, the Fenian Brotherhood, another secret society, was also founded by Irish 
immigrants in the United States who had emigrated during the Famine, with an aim at aiding 
Irish nationalism from abroad.30 Both the IRB and the Fenian Brotherhood dedicated themselves 
to fomenting a nationalistic mentality among the Irish, and created a corpus of emotional 
writings published in newspapers and novels over the decades. The broader Fenian movement 
ultimately promoted a shift towards armed resistance and rebellion, and Fenians staged yet 
another abortive rebellion in 1867. For the remainder of the century, some nationalists followed 
in O’Connell’s footsteps, dedicating themselves to the nonviolent constitutional struggle, while 
others believed in the persuasive means of physical force.  
 
27 State of Ireland. Hansard, House of Commons Debates [Hansard] 23 March 1846, vol. 84, cc. 1345. 
28 Foster, Modern Ireland, 375. 
29 Foster, Modern Ireland, 390. 
30 Foster, Modern Ireland, 391. 
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The alternative to O’Connell’s repeal movement came in the form of what became 
known as the Home Rule Movement. Granting Home Rule to Ireland would effectively turn 
Ireland into a British dominion outside the core United Kingdom of England, Scotland, and 
Wales, but still within the confines of the British Empire, similar to Canada, South Africa, and 
Australia.31 O’Connell died in 1847, but not until 1870, when Isaac Butt founded the Home Rule 
Association, did Irish nationalists have a solid political outlet to seek political emancipation from 
the British. Home Rule - federalizing the United Kingdom by dominionizing Ireland - thus 
became thought of as the prominent way to answer the Irish Question.  
The idiosyncratic Irish barrister Isaac Butt, himself originally an Orange Tory in party 
politics, had a soft spot for Irish nationalism, mainly caused from witnessing such an atrocious 
handling of the Famine.32 He went on to found the Home Rule Association in 1870, which is 
viewed as the official start of the Home Rule Movement that would last until Ireland’s 
partitioning half a century later. Home Rule became the dominant political movement of Irish 
Nationalists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Some in Westminster still 
thought in O’Connell’s terms of repealing the Union, but leaned more towards Butt’s Home Rule 
as the century came to a close.  
Butt differed from O’Connell in that he strove for a type of federalization of the United 
Kingdom: a local parliament in Dublin subservient to the Imperial parliament in Westminster.33 
Butt was not the first to suggest federalizing the United Kingdom, just its most ardent advocate 
for the Irish cause. The first mention of a separate legislation in Ireland came in a response to 
 
31 Attempts at federalizing parts of the British Empire began with Canada in 1867, becoming the first British 
territory to practice self-government under the British Executive, serving as an example for Irish Nationalists. The 
term “dominion” came directly from the Bible. 
32 Kelly, The Graves Are Walking. 200. 
33 Foster, Modern Ireland, 397. 
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O’Connell’s plea for repeal of the Union in a House of Commons speech by MP Thomas 
Macaulay in 1833. Macaulay claimed that, “if the advocates of Repeal wished to separate the 
Crowns of England and Ireland… a separation of the Legislatures of the two countries [is 
required].”34 Macaulay spoke of federating the United Kingdom, but no minister took him 
seriously, claiming two independent legislatures under one executive, “opposed the first 
principles of the science of government.”35 This effectively sidelined the repeal movement, and 
the anti-federalist argument, in its many forms, hindered Irish independence for the remainder of 
the century. But as unrest in Ireland increased as the Famine abated, the prospect of an Ireland 
outside the United Kingdom seemed more believable, and this frightened Unionists in the North. 
 Through the HRA, Butt attempted to attain some semblance of independence for Ireland, 
while appealing to Westminster by keeping Ireland in the Empire as a dominion through this 
federalist concept. In 1873, the HRA morphed into the Home Rule League, which was more of a 
political pressure group than a party, and a year later merged with Irish Nationalists in 
Westminster to form the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP), which continued to be led by Butt.36 
However, Butt and his Home Rulers met stiff resistance: in their first action towards achieving 
Home Rule three years after the Home Rule Movement began, Butt attempted to form a 
parliamentary committee to “consider the present parliamentary relations between Great Britain 
and Ireland,” and failed spectacularly in the House of Commons.37 This failure triggered a 
restructuring of Irish political leaders, as Butt came to be viewed as unassertive. Charles Stewart 
 
34 Address In Answers To The King's Speech. Hansard, House of Commons Debates [Hansard] 06 February 1833, 
vol. 15, cc. 238-97.  
35 Address In Answers To The King's Speech. Hansard, House of Commons Debates [Hansard] 06 February 1833, 
vol. 15, cc. 238-97. 
36 Foster, Modern Ireland, 608. 
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Parnell replaced him as the leader of the Home Rule Movement by 1877.38 Parnell brought with 
him a more aggressive stance in Westminster with varying degrees of parliamentary 
obstructionism, which included filibusters and staging walk-outs. Parnell headed the IPP by 1880 
and took a more aggressive stance toward Irish nationalism. He ultimately succeeded in forcing 
Liberals and Conservatives to negotiate with his IPP on the Irish Question through these 
tactics.39 
While Parnell climbed the political ladder to head the IPP, a Liberal government under 
the leadership of William Gladstone came to power in Westminster during this time on a ‘justice 
for Ireland’ platform, paving the way for collaboration between Irish Home Rulers and British 
Liberals. In 1886, Gladstone proposed the first Home Rule Bill, which failed in the House of 
Commons by only a slim margin, which showcased the growing support for Irish nationalism.40 
The bill proposed an independent and subordinate Irish parliament, but many Conservatives, as 
well as Liberals, saw the bill as flawed. Conservatives such as MP George Goschen argued in 
1886 against the bill stating Gladstone had been influenced by the “dark subterranean forces” of 
what can only be speculated as Irish Nationalism.41 Though not opposed to the establishment of a 
legislative authority in Ireland to deal exclusively with Irish affairs, then-Liberal MP Joseph 
Chamberlain thought the bill to be “very vague and indefinite, and would leave us all a very 
large discretion,” and likened the voting on this “dead bill” to a vote of no confidence in the 
Liberal government.42 
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Gladstone refined the first Home Rule Bill and proposed a second Bill in 1893, which 
now contained provisions for a bicameral legislature in Ireland, and the retention of 80 Irish MPs 
in Westminster.43 The First Home Rule Bill provided for a unicameral legislature, consisting of 
two Orders that could meet either together or separately.44 This time, with more clarification, the 
bill passed in the House of Commons, moving onto the Conservative controlled House of 
Lords.45 Once sent to the Lords, the bill failed to gain any political traction, receiving a similar 
amount of support to the ideas proposed by Butt during his HRA days.46 The House of Lords was 
the greatest opponent to the Home Rule Movement, as its members refused to approve any 
semblance of a devolved Irish government, and this prompted action from the Liberals of the 
Commons. 
The Liberal Party played a large role in Ireland’s Home Rule struggle, and partition later 
on. From the beginning of the Home Rule movement, Liberals supported Irish Nationalists 
claiming that granting the Irish self-government would strengthen the United Kingdom. Starting 
in 1906, Liberals enjoyed such a large majority in the House of Commons that they did not need 
to form a coalition government in order to pass bills.47 They further cemented their power in 
1908 with the election of Liberal PM Herbert H. Asquith. However, they lost this majority in the 
general elections of 1910, which forced them to work with Irish Nationalists to keep a Liberal 
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government in power.48 The Liberal Party closely associated itself with the Irish Question, 
wanting to grant Home Rule as a way to pacify Ireland, thus strengthening the United Kingdom. 
To do so, Liberals would therefore need to fulfil Ireland’s democratic demand for self-
government. 
In the interim, Nationalist MP John Redmond succeeded Parnell as head of the reunified 
IPP in 1900 after a political schism developed over Parnell’s leadership abilities, following his 
failure to push through the previous Home Rule Bill.49 Through Redmond, the IPP maintained 
that Ireland should become a dominion within the British Empire, gaining complete control over 
domestic affairs. He also believed that granting Ireland dominion status within the British 
Empire would foster loyalty for the Crown among the Irish.50 However, this pitted Irish 
Unionists against Irish Nationalists in a bid for Home Rule, culminating in a near civil war in 
Ireland on the eve of the greatest conflict the world had yet seen. With the third Home Rule Bill 
in the works, and preempting the inevitable denial of it from the Lords, the Liberal majority in 
the Commons passed, and received the Royal Assent on, the Parliament Act of 1911. This 
legislation curtailed the power of the House of Lords, preventing its members from vetoing bills 
passed onto them by the Commons no more than three times, ensuring that so long as a bill 
passed in the Commons on the fourth try, it would receive the Royal Assent.51 This set the stage 
for the introduction of the third Home Rule Bill. 
On 11 April 1912, Asquith took up the reins of Gladstone and proposed the third 
Government of Ireland Bill.52 Asquith made the Imperial argument that Westminster had too 
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many issues to deal with the, “grotesquely impossible task, varying from the infinitely great to 
the infinitely small, of which the House of Commons under our present system requires … to be 
constantly informed…”53 Making decisions on territories, colonies, and dominions throughout 
the Empire became too much for Asquith and the Liberal Party. An overwhelming sense that the 
British Empire was growing too big to manage efficiently gripped the Liberals, and they believed 
shedding some territory might help solidify the Empire. By restructuring the Empire into 
dominions subservient to an imperial parliament, which controls internal trade and foreign 
relations, those promoting the federation hoped it would improve imperial defence and trade. 
However, the anti-federation argument still held strong in the opposition bench with fears of 
undermining the autonomy of colonies, and the perceived inevitability of the collapse of the 
Empire.  
 Tories and Unionists alike maintained that the prerogative power of the crown could not 
be delegated to another parliament, without first that very parliament bestowing its sovereignty 
to the Crown. The British viewed Ireland as a strategic asset to the Empire’s core, thus 
Conservatives in particular used the Irish Question as an example of what could happen to other 
(lesser) British holdings around the world. British Conservatives viewed any measure of Home 
Rule in Ireland as the breaking up of the United Kingdom which would lead to the disintegration 
of the British Empire.54 Tories and Unionists thus aimed to use partition as a political tool in 
order to deter Home Rule as they knew Liberals, backed by Irish Nationalists, would never agree 
to such terms.  
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The Ulster Unionist Party was the most direct representative of the British establishment 
in Ireland. Unionists touted their connection with Britain, not only genetically as stated before, 
but also in equating the notions of nation and state, believing that the ultimate national goal 
should be the inhabitants of Britain and Ireland forming a single nation.55 They viewed Home 
Rule as a direct affront to their broader British-Irish national identity for this reason. Ulster 
Unionist MP Ronald McNeill spoke for all Unionists in 1913 when he explained Home Rule to 
be “the degradation of their [Unionist] position from being part and parcel of the United 
Kingdom... it is that degradation of their position which they resent and which they will not 
allow to be perpetrated if they can help it.”56 Unionists combined with the Tories in order to form 
the Conservative opposition to Home Rule. 
Debate over the third Home Rule Bill gridlocked Westminster, as both Liberals and 
Conservatives entrenched themselves in their respective Irish policies; no party would budge on 
their proposed compromises. Liberals wanted to grant Home Rule to the entirety of Ireland, 
Tories did not. If Home Rule was implemented, Conservatives suggested retaining the province 
of Ulster within the United Kingdom, as Protestants who resided there feared life under a Dublin 
(Catholic) parliament. Meanwhile, Ulster Unionists prevented Home Rule from moving forward, 
while Irish Nationalists would not succumb to the status quo. Finally, on June 11, 1912, Liberal 
MP Thomas Agar-Robartes officially proposed an amendment to the Home Rule Bill which 
temporarily excluded the four counties of Antrim, Armagh, Down, and Londonderry in Ulster.57 
This catered to Conservative wishes as a way out of the impasse. It also received an 
embarrassing amount of support from Liberals, and moved from a question of whether counties 
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should be excluded to a question of which counties should be excluded, and for how long the 
exclusion should last.58  
Agar-Robartes recognized the growing hostility between Nationalists and Unionists in 
Ireland, and moved into the camp that believed “Ireland consists of two nations different in 
sentiment, character, history, and religion.”59 This concession enabled the Bill to be passed in the 
Commons, sending it to the Lords for the expected third-time rejection, which played out over 
the following two years. Debate raged in the meantime, particularly over the number of Ulster 
counties to be excluded, ranging from Agar-Robartes’ temporary four county exclusion to a 
permanent nine county exclusion proposed by the Conservative House of Lords.60 The looming 
threat of Home Rule’s implementation, in any form, caused tension in Ireland to flare as both 
Unionists and Nationalists armed themselves in preparation to fight for their respective goals on 
Home Rule. 
Paramilitarism in Ireland changed the political landscape of the Home Rule Movement 
with the formation of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Irish National Volunteers (INV). 
The looming threat of the passage of the third Home Rule Bill for Protestant Ireland prompted an 
armed response in Ulster. In September 1912, Protestants began organizing en mass with the 
signing of the “Ulster Covenant,” which received nearly 500,000 signatures, including that of 
Unionist Leader MP Edward Carson.61  Fears of discrimination against Protestants in the 
proposed Catholic state of an independent Ireland caused Carson to form the UVF in 1913, and 
sought to form a provisional government in Ulster should Home Rule be enacted.62 Initial 
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militant supporters of the UVF numbered near 200,000 Ulster Protestants, and in June 1914, a 
shipment of 35,000 Mauser rifles and 2.5 million rounds of ammunition landed at Larne, 
Donaghadee, and Bangor under the direct supervision of British General Sir William Adair.63 In 
response to the formation of the UVF, Redmond formed the INV to help enforce Home Rule 
should it be passed. The INV similarly tried to import weapons and ammunition to arm 
themselves, but the British Army directly intervened by attempting to seize the arms shipment, 
causing 43 Irish casualties in total.64 Ireland by 1914 was on the verge of a civil war. 
Fiery speeches by Unionist MPs fanned the flames of the Protestant fears, and 
demonstrations of military drill accompanied by marches of paramilitaries brandishing Mausers 
became a regular occurrence in Ulster. The Curragh Camp Incident in early 1914 unequivocally 
proved that British forces would not be able to solve the Irish Question. With Home Rule set to 
become law later that year, Westminster aimed to use military measures to rein in paramilitarism 
in Ireland. But 60 British cavalry officers stationed in Curragh, County Kildare resigned from 
their positions rather than follow orders to reinforce British garrisons in Ulster, an order they 
believed to be aimed at coercing Ulster into accepting Home Rule.65 With Ireland on the verge of 
civil war, the British Army proved to be ineffective at solving the problem, leaving British 
policy-makers to decide Ireland’s fate. 
The last desperate attempt at a compromise on the Bill came at the Buckingham Palace 
Conference on July 21, 1914 when leaders of all major parties, including Redmond and Carson, 
met to settle the Irish Question. The compromise discussed which counties in Ulster would be 
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excluded from Home Rule, but not for how long the proposed counties would remain excluded.66 
Redmond utterly rejected this as he strove for a united Ireland without an exclusion, while 
Carson insisted that the six counties of Antrim, Armagh, Down, Fermanagh, Londonderry, and 
Tyrone should be administratively autonomous.67 Thus, after three days of meeting, the 
conference collapsed as no side could agree to a compromise. However, with escalating conflict 
in Europe threatening the stability of the Empire, Home Rule for Ireland became contingent on 
Britain’s ability to wage international war.  
 World War One exacerbated the divide between Ulster and the rest of Ireland, prompting 
different responses from different political sects in Ireland. Though the war averted, or at least 
delayed, conflict between Irish paramilitaries, the war became a political tool for all Irish 
factions involved, similar to the way in which British Conservatives used partition during Home 
Rule to their advantage. The outbreak of the war proved to be a defining factor on the Irish 
political scene, as it put off decision making on Home Rule for a time. Asquith immediately 
sidelined it, and the accompanying Amendment Bill, to focus on the growing conflict in 
Europe.68 This satisfied neither Nationalists nor Unionists, leaving the ball in the air until further 
notice. To complicate matters, Asquith’s cabinet remained divided as to how to approach the 
Irish Question: Home Rule could neither remain indefinitely suspended for fear of a Nationalist 
response from the INV, nor could Home Rule be implemented for fear of a Unionist response 
from the UVF. The delay pitted Unionist and Nationalist factions against each other in a bid for 
British favor over Home Rule. Unionists wanted to shelve Home Rule and maintain their union 
 
66 Fitzpatrick, The Two Irelands, 47. 
67 Hennessey, Dividing Ireland, 45. 
68 McEwen. "The Liberal Party and the Irish Question,” 110. 
26 
with Britain, while the Nationalists sought to implement Home Rule as soon as possible.69 
However, Redmond’s pledge of Nationalist support for the British war effort led to his faction 
splitting, further complicating the political battlefield in Ireland. 
Redmond advocated for Home Rule and wanted Ireland to attain dominion status within 
the British Empire, while Irish Republicans believed that Ireland could not take part in foreign 
politics while under what they considered a foreign occupation.70 Republicans unanimously 
condemned Redmond’s pledge for Nationalist support once the war broke out.71 This effectively 
split the Nationalist faction into Redmond's followers, on one hand, and the Republican 
nationalists of Sinn Féin, on the other. The two differed in that “Redmondites” of the IPP 
advocated political nationalism while Sinn Féiners advocated cultural nationalism. Redmondites 
wanted to achieve a representative national state that would guarantee uniform citizenship rights 
to that state’s members.72  
Redmond hoped that by supporting the British in their time of need, Westminster might 
grant Ireland Home Rule early.73 “Whether Home Rule is to have a future will depend on the 
extent to which Nationalists… do their part on the firing-line in France.”74 Nationalists saw 
support for the war as a precondition to Home Rule, they enlisted in hopes of gaining political 
independence. Redmondites feared that a refusal to support the war by Nationalists would turn 
British opinion against them and reinforce Unionists’ claims of a damaging Home Rule. Cultural 
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nationalists believed that the altruism of Redmond and his IPP was hypocritical. Sinn Féiners 
sought the alternative to this by attempting to establish an independent Irish Republic. 
Founded in 1906 by Arthur Griffith, Sinn Féin (we ourselves/ourselves alone) advocated 
for complete Irish independence, originally on a vague conservative platform of restoring a 
native Irish monarchy.75 Sinn Féin came to prominence only after Redmond split the IPP in 
1914, acting as a political magnet for many of his erstwhile supporters. Sinn Féin believed that 
the glory of a country came from the culture of its people, and with the near disappearance of 
Gaelic culture after the Famine, they sought the re-creation of Ireland’s distinctive national 
identity; a “moral regeneration of Ireland’s historic community.”76 To do this, Sinn Féin wanted 
nothing less than a completely united and independent Irish republic, free from all forms of 
British rule, and ultimately reversing Anglicisation in Ireland by severing all ties with Britain. 
Sinn Féin rejected Redmond’s attempts to grant Ireland self-government within the 
British Empire, wanting instead to build up Ireland materially and intellectually, and by April 
1916 openly claimed its goal to be the establishment of an independent Irish Republic. To 
accomplish this, its members focused their political platform on abstention from Westminster 
politics, instead attempting to form their own provisional government.77 Radical nationalists of 
Sinn Féin used the four years of hostilities in Europe to prove conclusively the old adage that 
‘England’s difficulties are Ireland’s opportunity.’ Radical Nationalists became more vocal about 
their disdain of British rule after the outbreak of World War One, and secretly prepared 
themselves to secede from the British Empire altogether by fighting from within for their version 
of an independent Ireland. 
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Asquith eventually decided on a compromise to pass the third Home Rule Bill with an 
accompanying Suspensory Bill, which would postpone Home Rule’s implementation until the 
end of the European conflict.78 In September 1914, Asquith presented his compromise to the 
House of Commons, and Conservative Leader MP Andrew Bonar Law responded with a 
seething speech in opposition, which ended with a Conservative walk-out in protest.79 This left 
the decision on passing an amended Home Rule (which included the four-county exclusion, and 
a proposal to suspend it until the end of the war) to the Liberals. The bills passed in the 
Commons and received Royal Assent through circumvention of the Lords granted by the 
Parliament Act. However, this decision backfired because it satisfied neither Unionists nor 
Nationalists, and Anglo-Irish relations continued to deteriorate. Though this decision provided 
both British parties with a brief respite from the Irish Question, the question was far from 
resolved, and Unionists and Nationalists now vied for British favor by contributing to the war 
effort. 
Recruitment into the British army in Ireland became heavily politicized throughout 
World War One. Unionists and Nationalists used their involvement in the war as a means to 
achieve their respective political agenda. The Redmond split in the Nationalist party led only to 
further politicize the war in Ireland, pitting nationalist against each other as well as Ulster 
Unionists. Through their combined efforts, more than 200,000 Irishmen, both Catholic and 
Protestant, served in the British Army over the course of the war.80 While Unionists and 
Nationalists competed for British favor over the implementation of Home Rule, Sinn Féin 
continued to defy British rule and fight for an independent Irish Republic. Ultimately, whatever 
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promise the 1914 Home Rule Bill held went out the window in April 1916 with the Easter Rising 
in Dublin. 
 On 24 April 1916, about 1,500 radical nationalists staged an armed rebellion in Dublin 
where they formally declared the formation of an independent Irish Republic ruled by the self-
styled Provisional Government of Ireland.81 Doomed from the start, the Rising lasted five days 
and ended with 16 leaders of the rebellion surrendering. Asquith quickly imposed martial law on 
Dublin, and a military court began hastily trying and executing leaders of the rebellion, which 
disturbed Liberal MPs in Britain, along with many others abroad.82 The Rising was not generally 
well received at first among the Irish people, many of whom had relatives serving in the British 
Army, which Britain used to suppress the Rising. But Britain’s harsh response of executing the 
leaders of the Rising is what ultimately turned the sympathies of the Irish toward Sinn Féin, 
strengthening the cultural Nationalist cause. This was a double-edged sword however, as the 
Rising only strengthened the Unionists’ cries of disloyalty among Irish Nationalists.83  
Britain's response to the Rising further complicated the political battlefield over the Irish 
Question as it moved back to the forefront of Parliamentary issues following the Rising. A 
rebellious Ireland posed grave danger to the British war effort and an Allied victory in Europe, 
so Asquith quickly imposed martial law in Dublin, and appointed Liberal MP David Lloyd 
George as Under-Secretary for Ireland to settle the Home Rule issue.84 Lloyd George began 
meeting with Irish political leaders at once to rectify the situation. Along with Redmond and 
Carson, he agreed to grant Home Rule, with a temporary six-county exclusion, and only on the 
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basis of negotiating further.85 Lloyd George assured Carson that Ulster would not be forced into 
Home Rule with the rest of Ireland, while Redmond received no reassurance on how temporary 
the exclusion would be.86 In the meantime, Redmond’s grasp on the IPP was slipping, and 
agreeing to partition Ireland did not work in his favor. 
The tumult caused by the Easter Rising essentially forced the IPP to seek terms with the 
government to reaffirm its loyalty to the British Crown, and restore calm over Ireland.87 
However, the swift executions of the rebel leaders caused most Irish Nationalists to side with 
Sinn Féin, further thinning the ranks of the IPP. With Home Rule teetering in the balance, and its 
outlet for support vanishing, the surge in Sinn Féin support threatened the longstanding 
relationship in Westminster between Irish Nationalists and British Liberals. In a further blow to 
the Liberal Party, Asquith enacted conscription in Britain in 1916, under great pressure from his 
opposition, which went against the very principles of voluntary service.88 Anti-Liberal feelings in 
Ireland were compounded by martial law in Ireland following the Easter Rising, and the Liberal 
Party began to falter. Asquith lost a vote of confidence in the Commons in October 1916, with 
only three-fifths of Liberal MPs voting, though he had the backing of every Unionist MP.89 In 
December, Asquith lost the premiership to his Liberal counterpart Lloyd George, who entered 
into a coalition with Conservative Leader Andrew Bonar Law, giving Conservatives more 
representation in the government.90 
With Home Rule still on the sidelines, Lloyd George formed an Irish Convention in mid-
1917 to assess the Irish Question, and charged it with finding the best form of Irish self-
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government within the greater confines of the Empire.91 The Convention essentially was a 
committee in charge of drafting up a new Home Rule Bill, and became a point of contention for 
all Irish parties involved; the IPP saw this as their moment for redemption, while Unionists 
opposed the convention maintaining that Home Rule should not be implemented, and Sinn Féin 
refused to participate altogether, based on their policy of abstention. The largely fruitless 
Convention dragged on for eight months, but a renewed German Spring offensive in 1918 
shattered any hope of implementing the Convention’s recommendations. 
By March of 1918, the German Ludendorff Offensive nearly broke the Allied forces on 
the Western Front, and Lloyd George considered implementing conscription in Ireland to 
replenish the dwindling ranks of the British 5th Army. Unionists supported this motion touting 
their unyielding support for the British Crown, while Redmond, trying to hold the remnants of 
his party together, argued that the only way to conscript the Irish would be as a condition for 
granting Home Rule.92 Thus, the Irish Question was complicated further as it turned to the 
question of mandatory military service in Ireland: Liberals and Nationalists wanted Home Rule 
without conscription, while Conservatives and Unionists wanted conscription without Home 
Rule. 
It is difficult to say how beneficial conscripting the Irish into the British Army would be 
in early 1918 given the state of open rebellion in Ireland, but estimates at the time anticipated 
150,000 recruits could be secured.93 Lloyd George, more concerned with winning the war in 
France than the resulting disturbances in Ireland, enacted conscription in Ireland without Home 
Rule on March 26, acting on the advice of his War Cabinet.94 This action went against the 
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counsel of every Irish advisor Lloyd George had discussed it with, including the Chief Secretary 
of Ireland H. E. Duke, who told him bluntly “we might almost as well recruit Germans.”95 
Attempting to conscript the Irish at the point of a bayonet only proved to work against the British 
by further bolstering the ranks of Sinn Féin, which used this opportunity to further its own 
political agenda.  
Lloyd George sent the former British Expeditionary Force commander Lord John French 
to oversee conscription in Ireland with military force, and within days of his arrival he suggested 
that he might need to impose martial law over the entire country.96 Catholic clergymen and Sinn 
Féiners preached open rebellion in the following months, which culminated with the arrest and 
deportation of 73 Sinn Féiners in May under the charge of plotting with Germany against 
Britain.97 Once the tide of the war in Europe began to shift in favor of the Allies in June, 
Westminster abandoned conscripting the Irish, and the war ended a few months later.  
By the end of the war in Europe, two Liberal PMs had proved unable to deliver on the 
promise of Irish Home Rule. Liberal Party leaders could not claim to support even their own 
values anymore, having enacted conscription in Britain and Ireland. Irish Home Rule continued 
to be a thorn in the Liberals side, which led to the demise of the Liberal Party.98 At the outset of 
World War One, Home Rule was a uniting factor within the Liberal Party for decades: all 
Liberals could agree on the principle of Home Rule, but by the end of World War One they all 
varied in its implementation over the complexities caused by the Easter Rising, imposed martial 
law, and a conscription crisis in Ireland.  
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The IPP all but disappeared in December 1918 when Sinn Féin seized landslide electoral 
victories across Ireland in the first (and last) all-Ireland election.99 Redmond had died earlier in 
1918, and the IPP failed to replace him with a competent leader. This resulted in Sinn Féin 
gaining support as the main Irish Nationalist party, with the only surviving leader from the Easter 
Rising, Eamon De Valera, as their newly elected president.100 The IPP almost ceased to exist 
overnight, retaining only six of its original 80 seats in Westminster; out of the 105 seats possible 
for Irish MPs, Sinn Féin filled 73 of them, including the first woman elected to British 
Parliament, Constance Markievicz.101 Likewise, Liberal parliamentary power significantly 
diminished after this election, but party members maintained that the Irish Question could be 
resolved indefinitely with the implementation of the third Home Rule Bill.102 Very few Irish 
Nationalists remained in Westminster, so Liberals could not hope to have any real swaying 
power; instead they formed a coalition with Conservatives to form a government.103 By this time, 
Irish nationalism had progressed significantly past old ideas of “dominion” Home Rule: it was on 
to complete independence. Sinn Féin ran on its platform of Westminster abstentionism, and after 
their victory in 1918 it practiced what it preached.  
The elected Sinn Féiners refused to sit in Westminster, instead moving to form their own 
unicameral parliament, Dáil Éireann (Assembly of Ireland) in Dublin on January 21, 1919.104 
This occurred on the same day as the Soloheadbeg Ambush, in County Tipperary, in which a 
column of IRA volunteers ambushed a contingent of Royal Irish Constabulary officers, killing 
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two of them.105 Britain viewed these tandem actions as a casus belli, and responded by making 
all of South Tipperary a militarized zone, and declared the assembly of Dáil Éireann illegal.106 
Anglo-Irish relations deteriorated to a new low with the outbreak of the Anglo-Irish War that 
followed, pitting the infantile Republic of Ireland against the post-war British Empire. Now in 
the midst of widespread open rebellion in Ireland, Westminster continued to seek an answer to 
the Irish Question with the drastically altered political playing field.  
The British Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) rose to prominence following the decline 
of the Liberal Party post-war, and became the main opposition to the Conservatives. The PLP 
promised “the fullest measure of Home Rule inside a federated United Kingdom” in their 1918 
manifesto.107 At the end of 1918, three options existed for Britain regarding the Irish Question: 
implement the suspended 1914 Home Rule Bill with the four-county exclusion, repeal the 1914 
Home Rule Bill indefinitely, or supersede it with new legislation. Lloyd George decided on the 
latter option, and appointed Unionist MP Walter Long as chairman to a new committee intent on 
finding a settlement to which Conservatives would agree.108 
In late 1919, the committee agreed to the necessity of two separate parliaments in Ireland, 
answerable to an all-Ireland Federal Council, and whose power would be delegated to by the two 
parliaments.109 These two parliaments would effectively administer Home Rule separately to 
their respective jurisdictions, with the new Federal Council to help oversee partition. The fourth 
Home Rule Bill, drafted in 1920 based on this committee's findings, provided for this dual Home 
Rule option in order to satisfy all parties left involved: the remaining Nationalists would be 
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granted dominion Home Rule, Ulster would have Protestant representation in Ireland, and Britain 
would not coerce Ulster into Home Rule. However, the committee suggested that all nine 
counties of Ulster be excluded from Home Rule with the explicit aim of eventually unifying 
North and South.110 Unionists, reluctantly accepting the separation of Ulster, opted instead for 
excluding only the six counties they knew they could control with a Protestant majority, hoping 
they could remain outside of the Home Rule dominion indefinitely if they kept the majority. 
The newest installment of the Home Rule Movement received flak from many MPs, 
mainly because it did not fundamentally answer the Irish Question. Labour MP John R. Clynes 
claimed the new bill would not generate unity or convince the (now openly rebellious) Irish to be 
loyal British subjects. “We ought, therefore, not to deceive ourselves with the thought that any 
such measure imposed on Ireland and forced by this superior Parliament will allay that patriotic 
demand or settle this century-old claim.”111 Using this argument, the entire PLP abstained from 
voting, along with the entire Opposition, believing it to be fundamentally flawed.112 Catering to 
the remaining Irish MPs in Westminster, the new committee on Ireland gave Unionists the six 
counties that had Protestant majorities, a decision more in line with the sectarian geography.113 
Unionists did not want to control areas with high numbers of Nationalists fearing that, in time, 
they may grow to outnumber Unionists in the region, leading to eventual unity with the South. 
The fourth Home Rule Bill received Royal Assent in December 1920. It passed, as had its 
predecessor, with all those opposed to it abstaining. However, Home Rule never went into effect 
in southern Ireland due to the ongoing Anglo-Irish War. 
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Anglo-Irish antipathies raged on for more than a year of brutal guerilla warfare, and 
though casualties were relatively low, terror and atrocities gripped Ireland for the duration of the 
conflict. An event that epitomizes the brutality of the war occurred on ‘Bloody Sunday,’ 
November 21, 1920, in which IRA strategist Michael Collins helped conduct a large-scale 
assassination, which unintentionally provoked a British overreaction. Collins and his ‘Twelve 
Apostles’ hit squad, reinforced by elements of the Dublin IRA Brigade, conducted a massive 
synchronized retaliatory strike against the entire British Secret Service operation in Ireland. In a 
matter of minutes, Collins and his men assassinated all 16 of the British Secret Service 
leadership, effectively crippling their intelligence network in Ireland. The British responded in 
kind later that day when Black and Tans, Britain's auxiliary military police, drove an armored 
personnel carrier onto the pitch of a Dublin Gaelic Athletic Association Gaelic football match at 
Croke Park, and began firing into the crowd, killing 14 and wounding hundreds.114 This sort of 
bloody tit-for-tat warfare wreaked havoc on the Irish population, both North and South, officially 
until mid-1921, and unofficially well into the 1970s. 
Irish and British forces agreed to a ceasefire in July 1921, and started the long peace 
treaty talks that officially brought about the end of hostilities. Republicans knew the stakes, and 
would not stand for anything less than a united independent Ireland outside of the British 
Empire. De Valera appointed Collins to be one of the Treaty negotiators, and over months of 
negotiations, Collins made countless trips to London, negotiating with some of Britain's most 
influential politicians.115 After long stressful months of negotiations, Collins and his fellow 
delegates, well informed on the terms of the Treaty, signed it as plenipotentiaries to the Dáil on 
December 6, 1921.  
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The Treaty merely forced Irish Republicans into administering the fourth Home Rule Bill 
as enacted by the British the previous year, the only alteration was that the Provisional 
Republican government in Dublin could stay in power, and transition over to the dominion 
government.116 It reinforced the six-county partition, and granted Northern Ireland one month to 
decide whether to opt in or out of the dominion Home Rule with the South.117 This essentially 
charged both Irish parties to figure out Home Rule and border creation on their own. Collins 
knew this, but dominion status was the best he and other delegates could hope for. He also knew 
that returning with these terms would be perceived as a betrayal to the Republican cause.118 This 
ideological betrayal would at best mean ruthless political in-fighting among Irish Republicans 
and former Nationalists, at its worst Collins suspected, “I may have signed my actual death-
warrant.”119 He could not have been more prescient. Collins died in an Anti-Treaty IRA ambush 
in the Irish Civil War that followed the Treaty signing. 
The day after Collins signed the treaty the Dáil debated and approved the treaty by a slim 
margin of seven votes.120 Two days later, De Valera resigned as President of Sinn Féin, and led 
the Anti-Treaty camp in walking out of an emotional, tear-filled Dáil, and the Provisional 
Government split.121 With many IRA officers as Teachtaí Dála (Assembly Delegates) in the 
newly formed Dáil, the political split in the Dáil over the Treaty replicated itself in the military. 
De Valera traveled the country giving speeches to large crowds expressing his disapproval of the 
Treaty, enticing the “volunteers of the past four years [Irish Republicans]” to continue fighting 
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for the Republic, even if it meant wading “through the blood of some of the members of the 
Government in order to get Irish freedom.”122 Civil war between the Pro-Treaty and the Anti-
Treaty camps soon followed as the Pro-Treatyites began working with Britain on implementing 
dominion Home Rule.  
Much of the controversy over the signing of the Treaty stemmed from Article 12, which 
established a Boundary Commission that would determine the future border between the North 
and South of Ireland.123 Through this Commission, Irish signatories believed that they could win 
back the North by mobilizing the Nationalist majority there.124 This ideology is exactly what 
worried Unionists, and while it was meant to be the coda of the Irish Question, the Commission 
proved horribly ineffective at settling the border issue. The Commission originally intended 
initiating a province-wide plebiscite to determine sectarian lines in Ulster, but backtracked on 
this, instead reverting to the outdated 1911 Census of Ireland.125 Article 12 provided no timetable 
for the Commission to make a decision, which further stoked the fears among border 
communities where sectarian violence increased. Northern Irish historian Robert Lynch 
examined the violent after-effects of the proposed, then delayed border implementation: 
Between 13 and 15 February [1922], thirty-one people were killed in Belfast, 
including six children after a bomb had been thrown into their school yard. The 
following month, the death toll reached unprecedented levels, principally due to 
the active participation of paramilitaries and new state police forces in the 
violence. In March… masked policemen [shot] six male members of the Catholic 
MacMahon household in their North Belfast home. The IRA would respond… 
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throwing bombs onto trams packed with Protestant shipyard workers, and… 
executing Protestant civilians lined up outside their burning homes.126  
 
The Northern counties and surrounding border counties experienced ebbs and flows of 
this sectarian violence for the remainder of the twentieth century. The Commission failed 
to resolve the border issue, and failed to stem the sectarian violence which followed. 
The Commission was composed of one delegate from each of the newly formed 
governments in the North and South, headed by a chairman appointed by the British 
government.127 The Irish Free State appointed its education minister, Eoin MacNeill, as its 
representative to the Commission after the Civil War ended in 1923.128 Britain appointed Richard 
Feetham, a member of the South African Supreme Court, as chairman of the Commission, and 
who was regarded as a neutral pick.129 However, Feetham later in the negotiations unequivocally 
ruled out the counties Tyrone and Fermanagh from joining the Free State.130 Compounding this, 
the government in the North refused outright to participate in both the all-Ireland Council (per 
Government of Ireland Act, 1920), and the Boundary Commission, leaving Britain to appoint a 
representative for it.131 The British chose a Unionist, ex-Belfast newspaper editor Joseph Fisher, 
to represent Northern Ireland, and the Commission finally met for the first time on October 24, 
1924.132 
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Outnumbered by the British 2-1 on the Commission, MacNeill attempted to work with 
them on a viable solution that would satisfy both parties involved. But a leaked document from 
the Commission, published in the Conservative Morning Post in Belfast, detailed the partition as 
largely unchanged from its establishment by the fourth Home Rule Bill.133 This outraged 
MacNeill as the Commissioners were sworn to secrecy over partition, and he brought the 
document leak up at a Commission meeting in Dublin on November 21, 1925, where the other 
members down played it, or outright denied it.134 This leak effectively sealed the Commission's 
fate, as MacNeill resigned from both the Commission and the Dáil soon thereafter, leaving the 
Conservative Commissioners to do as they pleased with the border.135 The Boundary 
Commission succeeded only in wasting time, and further damaging Anglo-Irish relations. The 
(Free State-less) Commission established the border through the fourth Home Rule Bill, largely 
unchanged, and as it stands today.  
By the end of 1925 an unsettling peace descended over Ireland in regards to partition, and 
both sides participated in a collective forgetting, during which neither side reconciled with the 
other. Those who refused to forget proceeded to construct a national narrative of revolutionary 
atonement in the South and patriotic resistance in the North, and succeeded in sporadically 
terrorizing border communities on either side of the partition. Partition utterly failed to resolve 
antagonisms between Nationalists and Unionists, leaving all parties involved more or less 
dissatisfied in the end.  
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Anglo-Irish relations have been strained since they began, and antipathies between 
Ireland and Britain, Catholics and Protestants, run deeper than could be chronicled here. 
Understanding Ireland’s history, both under the oversight of the British Empire, and briefly as an 
Independent Irish Republic, leading to the establishment of the Irish partition, helps to explain 
the course of Anglo-Irish relations. As a result of British mismanagement in Ireland, Irish 
Nationalists pursued various versions of self governance, through both peaceful and violent 
means over the course of a century.  
The struggle for repealing the Act of Union and subsequent Home Rule movement 
illustrate why Anglo-Irish relations deteriorated over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, and help to explain why relations continue to be strained over the course of current 
events, with the new-age Irish Question in the context of Brexit. Northern Ireland may be forced 
to reluctantly follow suit with whatever Britain decides on Brexit, just as Unionists reluctantly 
accepted partition as a condition to Home Rule, and let Britain decide the border for them. 
The Irish Question plagued Westminster for decades, mutating like a virus with every 
new host of uncertainties brought upon by the threat of civil war in 1914, the outbreak of 
international war, or rebellious uprisings. British Conservatives first used partition as a deterrent 
for granting Ireland dominion status within the British Empire, attempting to preserve the 
Empire’s holdings in fear of weakening the Empire. Their Liberal counterparts, originally 
appalled at the idea of partition, reluctantly accepted the idea in order to grant at least part of 
Ireland dominion status later on. It provided for the longstanding Liberal Party a fall from grace, 
and brought to the center stage the most prominent Irish political party to exist within the British 
Empire, and beyond.   
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Meaningful legislation on Ireland only passed in Westminster when large portions of the 
opposition abstained, leaving the majority to do as they pleased with decisions on Ireland, such 
as the Conservatives walking out on the Home Rule Bill in 1912, and Labour walking out on the 
Home Rule Bill in 1920. In contrast, partition was established without any democratic 
considerations, just as Northern Ireland may be forced to leave the EU in 2021 after having 
democratically voted to remain within it. While partisan violence waned in the years following 
the Good Friday Agreement, since the 2016 Brexit referendum there has been a steady increase 
in uncertainty over the border. The history of partition provides a guide on how to ameliorate 
Anglo-Irish relations going forward with the current border issue, or at least how not to strain 
them further. For democracy to prevail in Ireland, legislators must be beholden to the democratic 
demands of the population, instead of turning a blind eye in an attempt at holding on to the 
remnants of an oppressive power structure. Northern Ireland's future seems uncertain as the 
border, 100 years later, continues to be a point of contention, straining Anglo-Irish relations 
before, during, and after the implementation of the partition of Ireland.   
Partition was established as a British border on the island of Ireland, but we must 
remember that today the border belongs as much to the South as it does to the North, and I think 
the South are emphatic about the British border being at the beach. The Good Friday Agreement, 
signed by all three parties, states that Northern Ireland cannot change its constitutional status 
without a direct say from the people. The people, or at least those who voted, spoke in 2016 
when about 56 percent of the Northern Irish voted to remain in the EU, but this seems not to 
matter as they are still being taken out of the EU with Britain who essentially decided for them. 
Because of this, it seems Northern Ireland is not leaving the EU, but is being taken out of it. This 
is in direct conflict with the Good Friday Agreement, and could very well lead to bitter 
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contestation down the road. There will always be someone upset by either decision on the 
border, and if it's not the IRA it will be the UVF, evident now with the increase in partisan 
violence as of late. Ultimately, the EU would offer an institutional structure that would make it 
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